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We consider the desirability of modifying a standard Taylor rule for a cen-
tral bank’s interest-rate policy to incorporate either an adjustment for changes
in interest-rate spreads (as proposed by Taylor, 2008, and by McCulley and
Toloui, 2008) or a response to variations in the aggregate volume of credit (as
proposed by Christiano et al., 2007). We consider the consequences of such
adjustments for the way in which policy would respond to a variety of types
of possible economic disturbances, including (but not limited to) disturbances
originating in the financial sector that increase equilibrium spreads and contract
the supply of credit. We conduct our analysis using the simple DSGE model
with credit frictions developed in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), and compare
the equilibrium responses to a variety of disturbances under the modified Tay-
lor rules to those under a policy that would maximize average expected utility.
According to our model, a spread adjustment can improve upon the standard
Taylor rule, but the optimal size is unlikely to be as large as the one proposed,
and the same type of adjustment is not desirable regardless of the source of
the variation in credit spreads. A response to credit is less likely to be helpful,
and the desirable size (and even sign) of response to credit is less robust to
alternative assumptions about the nature and persistence of the disturbances
to the economy.
∗Prepared for the FRB-JMCB research conference “Financial Markets and Monetary Policy,”
Washington, DC, June 4-5, 2009. We thank Argia Sbordone, John Taylor and John Williams for
helpful discussions, and the NSF for research support of the second author. The views expressed in
this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect positions of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
†E-mail : vasco.curdia@ny.frb.org
‡E-mail : michael.woodford@columbia.edu
The recent turmoil in financial markets has confronted the central banks of the
world with a number of unusual challenges. To what extent do standard approaches
to the conduct of monetary policy continue to provide reasonable guidelines under
such circumstances? For example, the Federal Reserve aggressively reduced its oper-
ating target for the federal funds rate in late 2007 and January 2008, though official
statistics did not yet indicate that real GDP was declining, and according to many
indicators inflation was if anything increasing; a simple “Taylor rule” (Taylor, 1993)
for monetary policy would thus not seem to have provided any ground for the Fed’s
actions at the time. Obviously, they were paying attention to other indicators than
these ones alone, some of which showed that serious problems had developed in the
financial sector.1 But does a response to such additional variables make sense as a
general policy? Should it be expected to lead to better responses of the aggregate
economy to disturbances more generally?
Among the most obvious indicators of stress in the financial sector since August
2007 have been the unusual increases in (and volatility of) the spreads between the
interest rates at which different classes of borrowers are able to fund their activities.2
Indeed, McCulley and Toloui (2008) and Taylor (2008) have proposed that the in-
tercept term in a “Taylor rule” for monetary policy should be adjusted downward
in proportion to observed increases in spreads. Similarly, Meyer and Sack (2008)
propose, as a possible account of recent U.S. Federal Reserve policy, a Taylor rule
in which the intercept — representing the Fed’s view of “the equilibrium real funds
rate” — has been adjusted downward in response to credit market turmoil, and use
the size of increases in spreads in early 2008 as a basis for a proposed magnitude of
the appropriate adjustment. A central objective of this paper is to assess the degree
to which a modification of the classic Taylor rule of this kind would generally improve
the way in which the economy responds to disturbances of various sorts, including
in particular to those originating in the financial sector. Our model also sheds light
on the question whether it is correct to say that the “natural” or “neutral” rate
of interest is lower when credit spreads increase (assuming unchanged fundamentals
otherwise), and to the extent that it is, how the size of the change in the natural rate
compares to the size of the change in credit spreads.
Other authors have argued that if financial disturbances are an important source
1For a discussion of the FOMC’s decisions at that time by a member of the committee, see
Mishkin (2008).
2See, for example, Taylor and Williams (2008a, 2008b).
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of macroeconomic instability, a sound approach to monetary policy will have to pay
attention to the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. It is sometimes suggested,
for example, that a Taylor rule that is modified to include a response to variations in
some measure of aggregate credit would be an improvement upon conventional policy
advice (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2007). We also consider the cyclical variations
in aggregate credit that should be associated with both non-financial and financial
disturbances, and the desirability of a modified Taylor rule that responds to credit
variations in both of these cases.
Many of the models used both in theoretical analyses of optimal monetary policy
and in numerical simulations of alternative policy rules are unsuitable for the analysis
of these issues, because they abstract altogether from the economic role of financial
intermediation. Thus it is common to analyze monetary policy in models with a
single interest rate (of each maturity) — “the” interest rate — in which case we
cannot analyze the consequences of responding to variations in spreads, and with a
representative agent, so that there is no credit extended in equilibrium and hence
no possibility of cyclical variations in credit. In order to address the questions that
concern us here, we must have a model of the monetary transmission mechanism
with both heterogeneity (so that there are both borrowers and savers at each point
in time) and segmentation of the participation in different financial markets (so that
there can exist non-zero credit spreads).
The model that we use is one developed in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), as a rel-
atively simple generalization of the basic New Keynesian model used for the analysis
of optimal monetary policy in sources such as Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida
et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003). The model is still highly stylized in many re-
spects; for example, we abstract from the distinction between the household and firm
sectors of the economy, and instead treat all private expenditure as the expenditure
of infinite-lived household-firms, and we similarly abstract from the consequences of
investment spending for the evolution of the economy’s productive capacity, instead
treating all private expenditure as if it were all non-durable consumer expenditure
(yielding immediate utility, at a diminishing marginal rate). The advantage of this
very simple framework, in our view, is that it brings the implications of the credit
frictions into very clear focus, by using a model that reduces, in the absence of those
frictions, to a model that is both simple and already very well understood. The
model is also one in which, at least under certain ideal circumstances, a Taylor rule
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with no adjustment for financial conditions would represent optimal policy. It is thus
of particular interest in this context to ask what kinds of possible adjustments for
financial conditions are desirable when credit frictions are introduced into the model.
In section 1, we review the structure of the model, stressing the respects in which
the introduction of heterogeneity and imperfect financial intermediation requires the
equations of the basic New Keynesian model to be generalized, and discuss its nu-
merical calibration. We then consider the economy’s equilibrium responses to both
non-financial and financial disturbances under the standard Taylor rule, according to
this model. Section 2 then analyzes the consequences of modifying the Taylor rule,
to incorporate an automatic response to either changes in credit spreads or in a mea-
sure of aggregate credit. We consider the welfare consequences of alternative policy
rules, from the standpoint of the average level of expected utility of the heterogenous
households in our model. Section 3 then summarizes our conclusions.
1 A New Keynesian Model with Financial
Frictions
Here we briefly describe the model developed in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009). (The
reader is referred to that paper for more details.) We stress the similarity between
the model developed there and the basic New Keynesian [NK] model, and show how
the standard model is recovered as a special case of the extended model. This sets
the stage for a quantitative investigation of the degree to which credit frictions of
an empirically realistic magnitude change the predictions of the model about the
responses to shocks other than changes in the severity of financial frictions.
1.1 Sketch of the Model
We depart from the assumption of a representative household in the standard model,
by supposing that households differ in their preferences. Each household i seeks to
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where τ t (i) ∈ {b, s} indicates the household’s “type” in period t. Here ub(c; ξ) and
us(c; ξ) are two different period utility functions, each of which may also be shifted by
the vector of aggregate taste shocks ξt, and v
b(h; ξ) and vs(h; ξ) are correspondingly
two different functions indicating the period disutility from working. As in the basic
NK model, there is assumed to be a continuum of differentiated goods, each produced
by a monopolistically competitive supplier; ct(i) is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggegator of the
household’s purchases of these differentiated goods. The household similarly supplies
a continuum of different types of specialized labor, indexed by j, that are hired by
firms in different sectors of the economy; the additively separable disutility of work
vτ (h; ξ) is the same for each type of labor, though it depends on the household’s type
and the common taste shock.
Each agent’s type τ t(i) evolves as an independent two-state Markov chain. Specif-
ically, we assume that each period, with probability 1 − δ (for some 0 ≤ δ < 1) an
event occurs which results in a new type for the household being drawn; otherwise it
remains the same as in the previous period. When a new type is drawn, it is b with
probability pib and s with probability pis, where 0 < pib, pis < 1, pib + pis = 1. (Hence
the population fractions of the two types are constant at all times, and equal to piτ
for each type τ .) We assume moreover that
ubc(c; ξ) > u
s
c(c; ξ)
for all levels of expenditure c in the range that occur in equilibrium. (See Figure
1, where these functions are graphed in the case of the calibration discussed below.)
Hence a change in a household’s type changes its relative impatience to consume,
given the aggregate state ξt; in addition, the current impatience to consume of all
households is changed by the aggregate disturbance ξt. We also assume that the
marginal utility of additional expenditure diminishes at different rates for the two
types, as is also illustrated in the figure; type b households (who are borrowers in
equilibrium) have a marginal utility that varies less with the current level of expendi-
ture, resulting in a greater degree of intertemporal substitution of their expenditures
in response to interest-rate changes. Finally, the two types are also assumed to differ
in the marginal disutility of working a given number of hours; this difference is cali-
brated so that the two types choose to work the same number of hours in steady state,
despite their differing marginal utilities of income. For simplicity, the elasticities of
labor supply of the two types are not assumed to differ.
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The coexistence of the two types with differing impatience to consume creates
a social function for financial intermediation. In the present model, as in the basic
New Keynesian model, all output is consumed either by households or by the gov-
ernment;3 hence intermediation serves an allocative function only to the extent that
there are reasons for the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of households
to differ in the absence of financial flows. The present model reduces to the standard
representative-household model in the case that one assumes that ub(c; ξ) = us(c; ξ)
and vb(h; ξ) = vs(h; ξ).
We assume that most of the time, households are able to spend an amount dif-
ferent from their current income only by depositing funds with or borrowing from
financial intermediaries, and that the same nominal interest rate idt is available to all
savers, and that a (possibly) different nominal interest ibt is available to all borrowers,
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independent of the quantities that a given household chooses to save or to borrow.
(For simplicity, we also assume that only one-period riskless nominal contracts with
the intermediary are possible for either savers or borrowers.) The assumption that
households cannot engage in financial contracting other than through the intermedi-
ary sector represents the key financial friction.
The analysis is simplified by allowing for an additional form of financial contract-
ing. We assume that households are able to sign state-contingent contracts with one
another, through which they may insure one another against both aggregate risk and
the idiosyncratic risk associated with a household’s random draw of its type, but
that households are only intermittently able to receive transfers from the insurance
agency; between the infrequent occasions when a household has access to the insur-
ance agency,5 it can only save or borrow through the financial intermediary sector
3The “consumption” variable is therefore to be interpreted as representing all of private expendi-
ture, not only consumer expenditure. In reality, one of the most important reasons for some economic
units to wish to borrow from others is that the former currently have access to profitable investment
opportunities. Here we treat these opportunities as if they were opportunities to consume, in the
sense that we suppose that the expenditure opportunities are valuable to the household, but we
abstract from any consequences of current expenditure for future productivity. For discussion of
the interpretation of “consumption” in the basic New Keynesian model, see Woodford (2003, pp.
242-243).
4Here “savers” and “borrowers” identify households according to whether they choose to save or
borrow, and not by their “type”.
5For simplicity, these are assumed to coincide with the infrequent occasions when the household
draws a new “type”; but the insurance payment is claimed before the new type is known, and cannot
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mentioned in the previous paragraph. The assumption that households are eventu-
ally able to make transfers to one another in accordance with an insurance contract
signed earlier means that they continue to have identical expectations regarding their
marginal utilities of income far enough in the future, regardless of their differing type
histories.
As long as certain inequalities discussed in our previous paper are satisfied,6 it
turns out that in equilibrium, type b households choose always to borrow from the
intermediaries, while type s households deposit their savings with them (and no
one chooses to do both, given that ibt ≥ idt at all times). Moreover, because of the
asymptotic risk-sharing, one can show that all households of a given type at any
point in time have a common marginal utility of real income (which we denote λτt for
households of type τ) and choose a common level of real expenditure cτt . Household
optimization of the timing of expenditure requires that the marginal-utility processes














(1− δ)pibλbt+1 + [δ + (1− δ)pis]λst+1
}]
(1.2)
in each period. Here Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate, where Pt is the Dixit-
Stiglitz price index for the differentiated goods produced in period t. Note that each
equation takes into account the probability of switching type from one period to the
next.
Assuming an interior choice for consumption by households of each type, the






which relations can be inverted to yield demand functions
cbt = c




be contingent upon the new type.
6We verify that in the case of the numerical parameterization of the model discussed below, these
inequalities are satisfied at all times, in the case of small enough random disturbances of any of the
kinds discussed.
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Aggregate demand Yt for the Dixit-Stiglitz composite good is then given by
Yt = pibc
b(λbt ; ξt) + pisc
s(λst ; ξt) +Gt + Ξt, (1.3)
where Gt indicates the (exogenous) level of government purchases and Ξt indicates
resources consumed by the intermediary sector (discussed further below). Equations
(1.1)–(1.2) together with (1.3) indicate the way in which the two real interest rates
of the model affect aggregate demand. This system directly generalizes the relation
that exists in the basic NK model as a consequence of the Euler equation of the
representative household.
It follows from the same assumptions that optimal labor supply in any given
period will be the same for all households of a given type. Specifically, any household






t (j); ξt) = λ
τ
tWt(j)/Pt, (1.4)
where Wt(j) is the wage for labor of type j, and the exogenous factor µ
w
t represents a
possible “wage markup” (the sources of which are not further modeled). Aggregation
of the labor supply behavior of the two types is facilitated if, as in Benigno and
Woodford (2005), we assume the isoelastic functional form




where {H¯t} is an exogenous labor-supply disturbance process (assumed common to
the two types, for simplicity); ψb, ψs > 0 are (possibly) different multiplicative coef-
ficients for the two types; and the coefficient ν ≥ 0 (inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply) is assumed to be the same for both types. Solving (1.4) for the






























We furthermore assume an isoelastic production function
yt(i) = Ztht(i)
1/φ
for each differentiated good i, where φ ≥ 1 and Zt is an exogenous, possibly time-
varying productivity factor, common to all goods. We can then determine the demand
for each differentiated good as a function of its relative price using the usual Dixit-
Stiglitz demand theory, and determine the wage for each type of labor by equating


















is a measure of the dispersion of goods prices (taking its minimum possible value, 1,
if and only if all prices are identical), in which θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among differentiated goods in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Note that in the Calvo
model of price adjustment, this dispersion measure evolves according to a law of
motion
∆t = h(∆t−1,Πt), (1.8)
where the function h(∆,Π) is defined as in Benigno and Woodford. Finally, since









of total labor of each type j, they also receive this fraction of the total wage bill each
period. This observation together with (1.7) allows us to determine the wage income
of each household at each point in time.
These solutions for expenditure on the one hand and wage income on the other
for each type allow us to solve for the evolution of the net saving or borrowing of
households of each type. We let the credit spread ωt ≥ 0 be defined as the factor
such that
1 + ibt = (1 + i
d
t )(1 + ωt), (1.9)
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and observe that in equilibrium, aggregate deposits with intermediaries must equal
aggregate saving by type s households in excess of bgt , the real value of (one-period,
riskless nominal) government debt (the evolution of which is also specified as an
exogenous disturbance process7), which in equilibrium must pay the same rate of
interest idt as deposits with intermediaries. It is then possible to derive a law of
motion for aggregate private borrowing bt, of the form




t , Yt,∆t; ξt)− pibbgt






where the function B (defined in Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2009) indicates the amount
by which the expenditure of type b households in excess of their current wage income
is greater than the expenditure of type s households in excess of their current wage
income. This equation, which has no analog in the representative-household model,
allows us to solve for the dynamics of private credit in response to various types
of disturbances. It becomes important for the general-equilibrium determination of
other variables if (as assumed below) the credit spread and/or the resources used by
intermediaries depend on the volume of private credit.
We can similarly use the above model of wage determination to solve for the
marginal cost of producing each good as a function of the quantity demanded of it,
again obtaining a direct generalization of the formula that applies in the representative-
household case. This allows us to derive equations describing optimal price-setting by
the monopolistically competitive suppliers of the differentiated goods. As in the basic
NK model, Calvo-style staggered price adjustment then implies an inflation equation
of the form
Πt = Π(zt), (1.11)
where zt is a vector of two forward-looking variables, recursively defined by a pair of
relations of the form




t ; ξt) + Et[g(Πt+1, zt+1)], (1.12)
7Our model includes three distinct fiscal disturbances, the processes Gt, τ t, and b
g
t , each of which
can be independently specified. The residual income flow each period required to balance the
government’s budget is assumed to represent a lump-sum tax or transfer, equally distributed across
households regardless of type.
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where the vector-valued functionsG and g are defined in Cu´rdia andWoodford (2009).
(Among the arguments of G, the vector of exogenous disturbances ξt now includes
an exogenous sales tax rate τ t, in addition to the disturbances already mentioned.)
These relations are of exactly the same form as in the basic NK model, except
that two distinct marginal utilities of income are here arguments of G; in the case
that λbt = λ
s
t = λt, the relations (1.12) reduce to exactly the ones in Benigno and
Woodford (2005). The system (1.11)–(1.12) indicates the nature of the short-run
aggregate-supply trade-off between inflation and real activity at a point in time,
given expectations regarding the future evolution of inflation and of the variables
{zt}.
It remains to specify the frictions associated with financial intermediation, that
determine the credit spread ωt and the resources Ξt consumed by the intermediary
sector. We allow for two sources of credit spreads — one of which follows from an
assumption that intermediation requires real resources, and the other of which does
not — which provide two distinct sources of “purely financial” disturbances in our
model. On the one hand, we assume that real resources Ξt(bt) are consumed in
the process of originating loans of real quantity bt, and that these resources must be
produced and consumed in the period in which the loans are originated. The function
Ξt(bt) is assumed to be non-decreasing and at least weakly convex. In addition, we
suppose that in order to originate a quantity of loans bt that will be repaid (with
interest) in the following period, it is necessary for an intermediary to also make
a quantity χt(bt) of loans that will be defaulted upon, where χt(bt) is also a non-
decreasing, weakly convex function. (We assume that intermediaries are unable to
distinguish the borrowers who will default from those who will repay, and so offer
loans to both on the same terms, but that they are able to accurately predict the
fraction of loans that will not be repaid as a function of a given scale of expansion of
their lending activity.) Hence total (real) outlays in the amount bt + χt(bt) + Ξt(bt)
are required8 in a given period in order to originate a quantity bt of loans that will
be repaid (yielding (1 + ibt)bt in the following period). Competitive loan supply by
8It might be thought more natural to make the resource requirement Ξt a function of the total
quantity bt + χt(bt) of loans that are originated, rather than a function of the “sound” loans bt.
But since under our assumptions bt + χt(bt) is a (possibly time-varying) function of bt, it would in
any event be possible to express Ξt as a (possibly time-varying) function of bt, with the properties
assumed in the text.
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intermediaries then implies that
ωt = ωt(bt) ≡ χ′t(bt) + Ξ′t(bt). (1.13)
It follows that in each period, the credit spread ωt will be a non-negative-valued,
non-decreasing function of the real volume of private credit bgt . This function may shift
over time, as a consequence of exogenous shifts in either the resource cost function
Ξt or the default rate χt.
9 Allowing these functions to be time-varying introduces the
possibility of “purely financial” disturbances, of a kind that will be associated with
increases in credit spreads and/or reduction in the supply of credit.
Finally, we assume that the central bank is able to control the deposit rate idt (the
rate at which intermediaries are able to fund themselves),10 though this is no longer
also equal to the rate ibt at which households are able to borrow, as in the basic NK






which represents a Taylor rule subject to exogenous random shifts that can be given a
variety of interpretations. Here the “natural rate of output” Y nt — defined for present
purposes as the equilibrium level of aggregate output under flexible prices and in the
absence of financial frictions11 — is a function of exogenous fundamentals that does
not depend on monetary policy, and that by assumption does not depend on “purely
financial” disturbances. (This is of course only one simple specification of mone-
tary policy; we consider central-bank reaction functions with additional arguments
in section 2.)
9Of course, these shifts must not be purely additive shifts, in order for the function ωt(bt) to shift.
In our numerical work below, the two kinds of purely financial disturbances that are considered are
multiplicative shifts of the two functions.
10If we extend the model by introducing central-bank liabilities that supply liquidity services to
the private sector, the demand for these liabilities will be a decreasing function of the spread between
idt and the interest rate paid on central-bank liabilities (reserves). The central bank will then be
able to influence idt by adjusting either the supply of its liabilities (through open-market purchases
of government debt, for example) or the interest rate paid on them. Here we abstract from this
additional complication by treating idt as directly under the control of the central bank.
11For the definition of this quantity as a function of technology, preferences and fiscal variables in
the context of the basic (representative-household) NK model, see Woodford (2003, chap. 3). The
definition here is identical, up to a log-linear approximation, except that the parameter σ in the
equations of Woodford (2003) is replaced by the parameter σ¯ defined in (1.17) below.
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If we substitute the functions ωt(bt) and Ξt(bt) for the variables ωt and Ξt in the
above equations, then the system consisting of equations (1.1)–(1.3), (1.8)–(1.12),
and (1.14) comprise a system of 10 equations per period to determine the 10 endoge-








t , bt,∆t, and zt, given the evolution of the exogenous
disturbances. The disturbances that affect these equations include the productivity
factor Zt; the fiscal disturbances Gt, τ t, and b
g
t ; a variety of potential preference shocks
(variations in impatience to consume, that may or may not equally affect households
of the two types, and variations in attitudes toward work, assumed to be common to
the two types) and variations in the wage markup µwt ; purely financial shocks (shifts
in either of the functions Ξt(bt) and χt(bt)); and monetary policy shocks (shifts in
the function it(Πt, Yt)). We consider the consequences of systematic monetary policy
for the economy’s response to all of these types of disturbances below. Note that
this system of equations reduces to the basic NK model (as presented in Benigno and
Woodford, 2005) if we identify λbt and λ
s




t (so that the pair of
Euler equations (1.1)–(1.2) reduces to a single equation, relating the representative
household’s marginal utility of income to the single interest rate); identify the two
expenditure functions cs(λ; ξ) and cb(λ; ξ); set the variables ωt and Ξt equal to zero
at all times; and delete equation (1.10), which describes the dynamics of a variable
(bt) that has no significance in the representative-household case.
1.2 Log-Linearized Structural Equations
In our numerical analysis of the consequences of alternative monetary policy rules,
we plot impulse responses to a variety of shocks under a candidate policy rule. The
responses that we plot are linear approximations to the actual response, accurate in
the case of small enough disturbances. These linear approximations to the equilibrium
responses are obtained by solving a system of linear (or log-linear) approximations to
the model structural equations (including a linear equation for the monetary policy
rule). Here we describe some of these log-linearized structural equations, as they
provide further insight into the implications of our model, and facilitate comparison
with the basic NK model.
We log-linearize the model structural relations around a deterministic steady state
with zero inflation each period, and a constant level of aggregate output Y¯ . (We as-
sume that, in the absence of disturbances, the monetary policy rule (1.14) is consistent
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with this steady state, though the small disturbances in the structural equations that
we consider using the log-linearized equations may include small departures from the
inflation target of zero.) These log-linear relations will then be appropriate for ana-
lyzing the consequences of alternative monetary policy rules only in the case of rules
consistent with an average inflation rate that is not too far from zero. But in Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2009), we show that under an optimal policy commitment (Ramsey
policy), the steady state is indeed the zero-inflation steady state. Hence all policy
rules that represent approximations to optimal policy will indeed have this property.
We express our log-linearized structural relations in terms of deviations of the
logarithms of quantities from their steady-state values (Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ), etc.), the
inflation rate pit ≡ log Πt, and deviations of (continuously compounded) interest rates
from their steady-state values (ˆıdt ≡ log(1 + idt /1 + ı¯d), etc.). We also introduce
isoelastic functional forms for the utility of consumption of each of the two types,
which imply that




for each of the two types τ ∈ {b, s}, where C¯τt is a type-specific exogenous distur-
bance (indicating variations in impatience to consume, or in the quality of spending
opportunities) and στ > 0 is a type-specific intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Then as shown in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), log-linearization of the system
consisting of equations (1.1)–(1.3) allows us to derive an “intertemporal IS relation”
Yˆt = −σ¯(ˆıavgt − Etpit+1) + EtYˆt+1 − Et∆gt+1 − Et∆Ξˆt+1
−σ¯sΩΩˆt + σ¯(sΩ + ψΩ)EtΩˆt+1, (1.15)
where
ıˆavgt ≡ pibıˆbt + pisıˆdt (1.16)
is the average of the interest rates that are relevant (at the margin) for all of the
savers and borrowers in the economy; gt is a composite “autonomous expenditure”
disturbance as in Woodford (2003, pp. 80, 249), taking account of the exogenous
fluctuations in Gt, C¯
b
t , and C¯
s
t (and again weighting the fluctuations in the spending
opportunities of the two types in proportion to their population fractions);
Ωˆt ≡ λˆbt − λˆ
s
t ,
the “marginal-utility gap” between the two types, is a measure of the inefficiency
of the intratemporal allocation of resources as a consequence of imperfect financial
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intermediation; and
Ξˆt ≡ (Ξt − Ξ¯)/Y¯
measures departures of the quantity of resources consumed by the intermediary sector
from its steady-state level.12 In this equation, the coefficient
σ¯ ≡ pibsbσb + pisssσs > 0 (1.17)
is a measure of the interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand, using the notation sτ for
the steady-state value of cτt /Yt; the coefficient
sΩ ≡ pibpis sbσb − ssσs
σ¯
is a measure of the asymmetry in the interest-sensitivity of expenditure by the two
types; and the coefficient
ψΩ ≡ pib(1− χb)− pis(1− χs)
is also a measure of the difference in the situations of the two types. Here we use the
notation
χτ ≡ β(1 + r¯τ )[δ + (1− δ)piτ ]
for each of the two types, where r¯τ is the steady-state real rate of return that is
relevant at the margin for type τ . Note that except for the presence of the last three
terms on the right-hand side (all of which are identically zero in a model without
financial frictions), equation (1.15) has the same form as the intertemporal IS relation
in the basic NK model; the only differences are that the interest rate that appears is
a weighted average of two interest rates (rather than simply “the” interest rate), the
elasticity σ¯ is a weighted average of the corresponding elasticities for the two types of
households (rather than the elasticity of expenditure by a representative household),
and the disturbance term gt involves a weighted average of the expenditure demand
shocks C¯τt for the two types (rather than the corresponding shock for a representative
household).
Equation (1.15) is derived by taking a weighted average of the log-linearized forms
of the two Euler equations (1.1)–(1.2), and then using the log-linearized form of (1.3)
12We adopt this notation so that Ξˆt is defined even when the model is parameterized so that
Ξ¯ = 0.
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to relate average marginal utility to aggregate expenditure. If we instead subtract
the log-linearized version of (1.2) from the log-linearized (1.1), we obtain
Ωˆt = ωˆt + δˆEtΩˆt+1. (1.18)
Here we define
ωˆt ≡ log(1 + ωt/1 + ω¯),
so that the log-linearized version of (1.9) is
ıˆbt = ıˆ
d
t + ωˆt. (1.19)
and
δˆ ≡ χb + χs − 1 < 1.
Equation (1.18) can be “solved forward” for Ωˆt as a forward-looking moving aver-
age of the expected path of the credit spread ωˆt. This now gives us a complete theory
of the way in which time-varying credit spreads affect aggregate demand, given an
expected forward path for the policy rate. One the one hand, higher current and/or
future credit spreads raise the expected path of ıˆavgt for any given path of the policy
rate, owing to (1.19), and this reduces aggregate demand Yˆt according to (1.15). And
on the other hand, higher current and/or future credit spreads increase the marginal-
utility gap Ωˆt, owing to (1.18), and (under the parameterization that we find most
realistic) this further reduces aggregate demand for any expected forward path for
ıˆavgt , as a consequence of the Ωˆt terms in (1.15). The fact that larger credit spreads
reduce aggregate demand for a given path of the policy rate is consistent with the
implicit model behind the proposal of McCulley and Toloui (2008) and Taylor (2008).
But our model does not indicate, in general, that it is only the borrowing rate ibt that
matters for aggregate demand determination. Hence there is no reason to expect that
the effect of an increased credit spread on aggregate demand can be fully neutral-
ized through an offsetting reduction of the policy rate, as the simple proposal of a
one-for-one offset seems to presume.
Log-linearization of the aggregate-supply block consisting of equations (1.11)–
(1.12) similarly yields a log-linear aggregate-supply relation of the form
pit = κ(Yˆt − Yˆ nt ) + βEtpit+1 + ξ(sΩ + pib − γb)Ωˆt − ξσ¯−1Ξˆt, (1.20)
where Yˆ nt (the “natural rate of output”) is a composite exogenous disturbance term
(a function of all of the real disturbances, other than the purely financial disturbances
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and the shock to the level of public debt), corresponding to the equilibrium level of
output in a representative-household version of the model with flexible prices.13 The














where 0 < α < 1 is the fraction of prices that remain unchanged from one period to
the next; and
κ ≡ ξ(ωy + σ¯−1) > 0.
Note that except for the presence of the final two terms on the right-hand side,
(1.20) is exactly the “New Keynesian Phillips curve” relation of the basic NK model
(as expounded, for example, in Clarida et al., 1999), and the definitions of both the
disturbance terms and the coefficient κ are exactly the same as in that model (except
that σ¯ replaces the elasticity of the representative household). The two new terms,
proportional to Ωˆt and Ξˆt, respectively, are present only to the extent that there
are credit frictions. These terms indicate that, in addition to their consequences
for aggregate demand, variations in the size of credit frictions also have “cost-push”
effects on the short-run aggregate-supply tradeoff between aggregate real activity and
inflation.
Finally, the central-bank reaction function (1.14) can be log-linearized to yield
ıˆdt = r
n
t + φpipit + φy(Yˆt − Yˆ nt ) + ²mt . (1.21)
where rnt represents exogenous variations in the “natural rate of interest” — the
equilibrium real rate of interest in a flexible-price equilibrium, in the case of a
representative-household version of the model — and ²mt is an additional exogenous
disturbance term, assumed to be unrelated to economic “fundamentals,” to which we
shall refer as a “monetary policy shock.” Except for the disturbance ²mt , this is the
13The notation here differs from that in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), so that the “output gap”
that appears in this equation coincides with the one to which policy is assumed to respond in the
Taylor rules considered below. See the technical appendix for a precise definition of the term Yˆ nt in
this paper.
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form of linear rule recommended by Taylor (1993). The implications of such a rule
for the evolution of the composite interest rate ıˆavgt that appears in the IS relation
(1.15) can be derived by using (1.19) to write
ıˆavgt = ıˆ
d
t + pibωˆt. (1.22)
The policy rule (1.21) in our baseline specification is intended as a simple rep-
resentation of conventional policy advice for an economy in which purely financial
disturbances are not an important source of aggregate economic instability. Apart
from its familiarity (and some degree of realism), we also note that in the context
of a version of our model without financial frictions, this kind of policy rule would
represent an optimal policy, at least under certain ideal circumstances. To be precise,
in the representative-household version of our model14 (where we therefore abstract
entirely from financial frictions), if we set ²mt = 0 at all times and choose coefficients
φpi and φy consistent with the “Taylor Principle” (as defined in Woodford, 2003, chap.
4), this rule leads to a determinate equilibrium in which inflation is equal to zero at
all times, and the “output gap” Yˆt− Yˆ nt is equal to zero at all times as well, as long as
there are no cost-push shocks (ut = 0 at all times). Such a policy is optimal from the
standpoint of an ad hoc stabilization objective that involves only squared deviations
of the inflation rate and of the output gap from zero; it is also optimal in the sense
of maximizing the expected utility of the representative household under somewhat
more special circumstances,15 as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 6). Because the
Taylor rule would be optimal, at least under certain circumstances, in the absence
of credit frictions, it is of interest to consider the extent to which the introduction
of credit frictions makes it desirable to modify the baseline rule by responding in
addition to measures of financial conditions.
14This case can be nested as a special parametric case of the model expounded here, as discussed
in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009).
15In addition to requiring the absence of cost-push shocks, this result requires a subsidy that offsets
the distortion due to the market power of the monopolistically competitive producers. Benigno and
Woodford (2005) discuss still more restrictive cases in which full inflation stabilization remains the
optimal policy, even in the presence of steady-state distortions due to market power or taxes.
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1.3 Numerical Calibration
The numerical values for parameters that are used in our calculations below are
the same as in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009). Many of the model’s parameters are
also parameters of the basic NK model, and in the case of these parameters we
assume similar numerical values as in the numerical analysis of the basic NK model
in Woodford (2003, Table 6.1.), which in turn are based on the empirical model of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The new parameters that are also needed for the
present model are those relating to heterogeneity or to the specification of the credit
frictions. The parameters relating to heterogeneity are the fraction pib of households
that are borrowers, the degree of persistence δ of a household’s “type”, the steady-
state expenditure level of borrowers relative to savers, sb/ss, and the interest-elasticity
of expenditure of borrowers relative to that of savers, σb/σs.
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In the calculations reported here, we assume that pib = pis = 0.5, so that there
are an equal number of borrowers and savers. We assume that δ = 0.975, so that the
expected time until a household has access to the insurance agency (and its type is
drawn again) is 10 years. This means that the expected path of the spread between
lending and deposit rates for 10 years or so into the future affects current spending
decisions, but that expectations regarding the spread several decades in the future
are nearly irrelevant.
We calibrate the degree of heterogeneity in the steady-state expenditure shares
of the two types so that the implied steady-state debt b¯ is equal to 80 percent of
annual steady-state output.17 This value matches the median ratio of private (non-
financial, non-government, non-mortgage) debt to GDP over the period 1986-2008.18
This requires a ratio sb/ss = 1.27. We calibrate the value of σb/σs to equal 5. This
is an arbitrary choice, though the fact that borrowers are assumed to have a greater
willingness to substitute intertemporally is important, as this results in the prediction
that an exogenous tightening of monetary policy (a positive value of the residual ²mt
in (1.14)) results in a reduction in the equilibrium volume of credit bt (see Figures 2
16Another new parameter that matters as a consequence of heterogeneity is the steady-state level
of government debt relative to GDP, b¯g/Y¯ ; here we assume that b¯g = 0.
17In our quarterly model, this means that b¯/Y¯ = 3.2.
18We exclude mortgage debt when calibrating the degree of heterogeneity of preferences in our
model, since mortgage debt is incurred in order to acquire an asset, rather than to consume current
produced goods in excess of current income.
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and 5 below). This is consistent with VAR evidence on the effects of an identified
monetary policy shock on household borrowing.19
It is also necessary to specify the steady-state values of the functions ω(b) and
Ξ(b) that describe the financial frictions, in addition to making clear what kinds
of random perturbations of these functions we wish to consider when analyzing the
effects of “financial shocks.” We here present results for two cases. In each case, we
assume that the steady-state credit spread is due entirely to the marginal resource
cost of intermediation;20 but we do allow for exogenous shocks to the default rate,
and this is what we mean by the “financial shock” in Figures 6 and 13 below.21 In
treating the “financial shock” as involving an increase in markups but no increase in
the real resources used in banking, we follow Gerali et al. (2008).22
The two cases considered differ in the specification of the (time-invariant) interme-
diation technology Ξ(b). In the case of a linear intermediation technology, we suppose
that Ξ(b) = Ξ˜b, while in the case of a convex intermediation technology, we assume
that
Ξ(b) = Ξ˜bη (1.23)
for some η > 1.23 In both cases, in our numerical analyses we assume a steady-state
19See, for example, Den Haan et al. (2004).
20We assume this in the results presented here because we do not wish to appear to have sought
to minimize the differences between a model with financial frictions and the basic NK model, and
the use of real resources by the financial sector (slightly) increases the differences between the two
models.
21Note that our conclusions regarding both equilibrium and optimal responses to shocks other
than the “financial shock” are the same as in an economy in which the banking system is perfectly
competitive (and there are no risk premia), up to the linear approximation used in the numerical
results reported below.
22These authors cite the Eurosystem’s quarterly Bank Lending Survey as showing that since
October 2007, banks in the euro area had “strongly increased the margins charged on average and
riskier loans” (p. 24).
23One interpretation of this function is in terms of a monitoring technology of the kind assumed
in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). Suppose that a bank produces monitoring according to a




t , where k is a fixed factor (“bank capital”), and
must produce a unit of monitoring for each unit of loans that it manages. Then the produced
goods Ξt required as inputs to the monitoring technology in order to manage a quantity b of loans
will be given by a function of the form (1.23), where Ξ˜ = k1−η. A sudden impairment of bank
capital, treated as an exogenous disturbance, can then be represented as a random increase in the
multiplicative factor Ξ˜. This is another form of “financial shock”, with similar, though not identical,
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credit spread ω¯ equal to 2.0 percentage points per annum,24 following Mehra et al.,
(2008).25 (Combined with our assumption that “types” persist for 10 years on average,
this implies a steady-state “marginal utility gap” Ω¯ ≡ λ¯b/λ¯s = 1.22, so that there
would be a non-trivial welfare gain from transferring further resources from savers
to borrowers.) In the case of the convex technology, we set η so that a one-percent
increase in the volume of credit increases the credit spread by one percentage point
(per annum).26 The assumption that η > 1 allows our model to match the prediction
of VAR estimates that an unexpected tightening of monetary policy is associated with
a slight reduction in credit spreads (see, e.g., Lown and Morgan, 2002, and Gerali et
al., 2008). We have chosen a rather extreme value for this elasticity in our calibration
of the convex-technology case, in order to make more visible the difference that a
convex technology makes for our results. (In the case of a smaller value of η, the
results for the convex technology are closer to those for the linear technology, and in
fact are in many respects similar to those for an economy with no financial frictions
at all.)
As a first exercise, we consider the implied equilibrium responses of the model’s
endogenous variables to the various kinds of exogenous disturbances, under the as-
sumption that monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule of the form (1.21). The
coefficients of the monetary policy rule are assigned the values φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0.5
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as recommended by Taylor (1993).28 Among other disturbances, we consider the ef-
fects of random disturbances to the error term ²mt in the monetary policy rule. In
section 2, we consider the predicted dynamics under a variety of other monetary
policy specifications as well.
In all of the cases that we consider, we assume that each of the exogenous distur-
effects as the default rate shock considered below.
24In our quarterly numerical model, this means that we choose a value such that (1+ ω¯)4 = 1.02.
25Mehra et al. argue for this calibration by dividing the net interest income of financial intermedi-
aries (as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts) by a measure of aggregate private
credit (as reported in the Flow of Funds). As it happens, this value also corresponds to the median
spread between the FRB index of commercial and industrial loan rates and the federal funds rate,
over the period 1986-2007.
26This requires that η = 51.6.
27This is the value of φy if ıˆdt and pit are quoted as annualized rates, as in Taylor (1993). If,
instead, (1.21) is written in terms of quarterly rates, then the coefficient on Yˆt is only 0.5/4.
28See, for example, Taylor (2007) as an example of more recent advocacy of a rule with these same
coefficients.
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bances ξit evolves according to an AR(1) process,
ξit = ρiξi,t−1 + ²it,
where ²it is a mean-zero i.i.d. random process, and that these processes are indepen-
dent for the different disturbances i. We make various assumptions about the size of
the coefficient of serial correlation ρi and the standard deviation of the innovations
²it, that are explained below.
1.4 Credit Frictions and the Propagation of Disturbances
We can explore the consequences of introducing financial frictions into our model by
considering the predicted responses to aggregate disturbances of a kind that also exist
in the basic NK model, and see how much difference to our results the allowance for
credit frictions makes. A special case in which we obtain a simple result is that in
which (i) Ξt is an exogenous process (i.e., independent of bt — there are no variable
resource costs of intermediation), and (ii) χt(b) is a linear function, χt(b) = χ˜tb, at
all times (i.e., the default rate is independent of the volume of lending), though the
default rate may vary (exogenously) over time. In this case, (1.13) implies that ωt
will also be an exogenous process (equal to χ˜t), and (1.18) implies that Ωˆt will be an
exogenous process (determined purely by the evolution of χ˜t).
In this case, the set of equations (1.15), (1.20), (1.21) and (1.22) comprise a com-
plete system for determination of the equilibrium evolution of the variables pit, Yˆt, ıˆ
d
t ,
and ıˆavgt , given the evolution of the exogenous disturbances, that now include Ξˆt and
ωˆt disturbances. If we use (1.22) to substitute for ıˆ
d
t in (1.21), we obtain an equation




t + φpipit + φy(Yˆt − Yˆ nt ) + pibωˆt + ²mt . (1.24)
Then equations (1.15), (1.20) and (1.24) comprise a complete system for determi-
nation of pit, Yˆt, and ıˆ
avg
t . This system of equations is a direct generalization of the
familiar “three-equation system” in expositions of the log-linearized basic NK model,
as in Clarida et al. (1999).
In fact, this system of equations is identical to the structural equations of the
basic NK model, if the latter model is parameterized by assigning the representative
household an intertemporal elasticity of substitution that is an appropriately weighted
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average of the intertemporal elasticities of the two types in this model.29 The only
differences from the equations of the basic model are that the interest rate ıˆavgt in this
system need not correspond to the policy rate, and that each of the three equations
contains additional additive disturbance terms (ωˆt, Ωˆt, and Ξˆt terms) owing to the
possibility of time variation in the credit frictions.
This means that the predictions of the model about the equilibrium responses of
inflation, output and nominal interest rates to any of the non-financial disturbances
— disturbances to tastes, technology, monetary policy, or fiscal policy, all of which
are also allowed for in the basic NK model — under a given monetary policy rule are
identical to those of the basic NK model. (The linearity of the approximate model
equations implies that the impulse responses to any of the non-financial disturbances
are independent of what we assume about the size of the financial disturbances.)
Hence our conclusions about the desirability of a given form of Taylor rule — at least
from the standpoint of success in stabilizing inflation, output or interest rates — will
be exactly the same as in the basic NK model, except to the extent that we may be
concerned about the ability of policy to stabilize the economy in response to purely
financial disturbances (which are omitted in the basic NK model).
This conclusion requires somewhat special assumptions; but numerical analysis of
our calibrated model suggests that the conclusion is not too different even when one
allows ωt and Ξt to vary endogenously with variations in the volume of private credit.
In the numerical results shown in Figures 2-5, we plot the equilibrium responses to
various types of disturbances (a different disturbance in each figure, with the responses
of different variables in the separate panels of each figure). In each figure, we compare
the equilibrium responses to the same disturbance in three different models. The
“FF” model is the model with heterogeneity and financial frictions described in the
previous sections. The “NoFF” model is a model with preference heterogeneity of the
same type (and correspondingly parameterized), but in which there are no financial
frictions (ωt and Ξt are set equal to zero at all times). Finally, the “RepHH” model is
a representative household model, with parameters that are present in the FF model
29A key parameter of the basic NK model is σ ≡ scσ˜, where σ˜ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of private expenditure, and sc is the steady-state share of private expenditure in total
aggregate demand. (See Woodford, 2003, p. 243.) For the equivalence asserted in the text to obtain,
it is necessary to parameterize the representative-household model so that σ has the value of the
coefficient σ¯ (defined in (1.17)) in our model.
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calibrated in the same way as in the other two models.30
We first consider the case of a linear intermediation technology (η = 1). In this
case, the credit spread ωt still evolves exogenously, as assumed in the discussion
above, but Ξt is no longer independent of bt. Nonetheless, in this case we continue to
find that for an empirically plausible specification of the quantity of resources used
in intermediation, the existence of credit frictions makes virtually no difference for
the predicted equilibrium responses to shocks.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case of a contractionary monetary policy
shock, represented by a unit (one percentage point, annualized) increase in ²mt .We fur-
thermore assume that the policy disturbance is persistent; specifically, ²mt is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process with coefficient of autocorrelation ρ = 0.6.31 The separate
panels of the figure indicate the impulse responses of output, inflation,32 the deposit
rate (policy rate), the credit spread,33 and aggregate private credit respectively.
We observe that the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the two interest
rates are virtually identical under all three parameterizations of the model. (The same
is true for all of the other non-financial aggregate disturbances in the model, though
we do not include these figures here.) Even when we assume that intermediation uses
resources (and indeed that credit spreads are entirely due to the marginal resource
cost of making additional loans), and that the required resources are proportional to
the volume of lending, heterogeneity and the existence of a steady-state credit spread
(of a realistic magnitude) still make only a negligible difference. This is because the
30The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the representative household is a weighted average
of the elasticities of the two types in the models with preference heterogeneity, as discussed in the
previous footnote.
31We assume a lower degree of persistence for this disturbance than for the others considered
below, in order to make the shock considered in this figure similar in its implications to the identified
monetary policy shocks in VAR studies. This value also makes the results shown in Figure 2 for the
“RepHH” model directly comparable to those reported for the case ρ = 0.6 in the discussion of the
basic NK model in Woodford (2003, chap. 4).
32In the plots, both the inflation rate and the interest rates are reported as annualized rates, so
that 0.10 means an increase in the inflation rate of 10 basis points per annum. In terms of our
quarterly model, what is plotted is not the response of pit, but rather the response of 4pit.
33In the present model, the spread is exogenously fixed, and so there is necessarily a zero response
of this variable, except in the case of a shock to the exogenous credit spread itself. However,
we include this panel as we use the same format for the figures to follow, when the spread is an
endogenous variable.
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contribution of the banking sector to the overall variation in the aggregate demand
for produced goods and services is still quite small.
The inclusion of heterogeneity and an intermediary sector in the model does have
one important consequence, even in this case, and that is that the model now makes
predictions about the evolution of the volume of credit. As noted earlier, under our
proposed calibration, a tightening of monetary policy causes credit to contract (as
VARs show, especially in the case of consumer credit), despite the fact that there is
no mechanical connection between monetary policy and credit supply in our model.34
The size of the credit contraction in response to a monetary policy shock is smaller
in the “FF” model than in the “NoFF” model, but it remains of the same sign.
Financial frictions matter somewhat more for equilibrium dynamics if we also
assume that credit spreads vary endogenously with the volume of lending. Figure 3
shows the responses to the same kind of monetary policy shock as in Figure 2, but
in the case of the “convex intermediation technology” calibration (η >> 1) discussed
in the previous section. We again find that the equilibrium responses of output and
inflation are nearly the same in all three models, though the “FF model” is no longer
quite so indistinguishable from the “NoFF” model. The most important effect of
allowing for endogeneity of the credit spread is on the implied responses of interest
rates to the shock. Because credit contracts in response to this shock (as noted earlier,
though now by less than in Figure 2, because the supply of credit is less elastic), the
spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate decreases, in accordance with
the empirical finding of Lown and Morgan (2002). This means that the deposit rate
rises more than does the lending rate. As a result, the increase in the policy rate is
somewhat higher in the “FF model” than in the absence of credit frictions.35
The differences are more visible in the case of an exogenous increase in the pro-
ductivity factor Zt, shown in Figure 4. (In both Figures 4 and 5, the exogenous dis-
turbance is assumed to be an AR(1) process with autoregressive coefficient ρξ = 0.9.)
Though again the largest effect is on the path of the deposit rate, in this case the en-
dogeneity of the markup also has non-negligible effects on the equilibrium response of
34We do not, for example, assume that credit can only be supplied by commercial banks, that
in turn can only finance their lending by attracting deposits subject to a reserve requirement — so
that variations in the supply of reserves by the central bank have a direct effect on loan supply.
35This is consistent with the Taylor rule, because output declines slightly less in the “FF model”
than in the “NoFF” model, though the difference is not large enough to be easily visible in Figure
3.
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output. (The primary reason for the difference is that this shock has a larger immedi-
ate effect on the path of credit, and hence a larger immediate effect on the equilibrium
spread in the case of the convex technology.) Because an increase in productivity leads
to an expansion of credit, credit spreads now increase in the ‘FF model’; this is has
a contractionary effect on aggregate demand, so that output increases less than in
the “NoFF model.” Similar effects of financial frictions are observed in the case of a
disturbance to the disutility of working (an exogenous increase in the multiplicative
factor H¯t in (1.5)). The effects of an increase in the wage markup µ
w
t or the tax rate
τ t are likewise similar, but with opposite signs to the effects shown in Figure 4.
Finally, the consequences of financial frictions are of particular qualitative signifi-
cance in the case of a disturbance to the path of government debt (Figure 5). Here we
consider a disturbance to fiscal policy that temporarily increases the level of govern-
ment debt, through a lump-sum transfer to households, which is then gradually taken
back over a period of time, so that the path of real government debt is eventually the
same as it would have been in the absence of the shock. In the case of the “NoFF
model”, Ricardian equivalence holds, as in the representative household model; and
so in these cases, the fiscal shock has no effect on output, inflation, or interest rates.
However, an increase in government borrowing crowds out private borrowing, and
in the case of the convex intermediation technology, the reduced private borrowing
implies a reduction in spreads. This has an expansionary effect on aggregate de-
mand, with the consequence that both output and inflation increase, as shown in the
figure.36
To sum up, we find that under an empirically realistic calibration of the average
size of credit spreads, the mere existence of a positive credit spread does not imply
any substantial quantitative difference for our model’s predictions, either about the
effects of a monetary policy shock or about the effects of other kinds of exogenous dis-
turbances under a given systematic monetary policy. What matters somewhat more
is the degree to which there is variation in credit spreads. If spreads vary endoge-
nously (as in our model with a convex intermediation technology), then the effects of
36Ricardian equivalence does not hold precisely in the “FF model” even in the case of the linear
intermediation technology. However, in this case (not shown) there is no reduction in credit spreads
in response to the shock, and the only consequence for aggregate demand comes from the reduction
in the resources used by the banking sector, so that shock is actually (very slightly) contractionary
in this case. But there is very little difference in the predictions of the “NoFF” and “FF” models in
the case of that technology, so that we omit the figure here.
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disturbances are somewhat different, especially in the case of types of disturbances
— such as variations in government borrowing, or changes in the relative spending
opportunities available to savers as opposed to borrowers — that particularly affect
the evolution of the equilibrium volume of private credit.
Another important difference of the model with credit frictions is the possibility
of exogenous disturbances to the financial sector itself, represented by exogenous
variation in either the intermediation technology Ξt(b) or the default rate schedule
χt(b). Again, these disturbances matter to the determination of aggregate output,
inflation and interest rates primarily to the extent that they imply variation in credit
spreads. Figure 6 shows the responses (for the “FF” model only, and in the case
of the convex intermediation technology) to an exogenous shift up in the schedule
χt(b), of a size that would increase the credit spread by 4 percentage points (as an
annualized rate) for a given volume of private credit.37 (Because of the contraction
of credit that results, in equilibrium the shock increases the credit spread by less
than three percentage points.) Under the baseline Taylor rule, this kind of “purely
financial” disturbance increases the credit spread and contracts aggregate credit; it
also contracts real activity and lowers inflation. (An increase in the credit spread
owing to an increase in the marginal resource cost of intermediation has similar effects,
not shown.) We show below that these responses to the shock are not desirable on
welfare grounds. One of key issues taken up in the next section is whether modification
of the baseline Taylor rule to directly respond to financial variables can improve upon
these responses.
2 Adjustments to the Baseline Taylor Rule
We turn now to the consequences of modifying the baseline Taylor rule by including
a direct response to some measure of financial conditions. We first discuss the welfare
criterion that we use to evaluate candidate policy rules, and then turn to our results
for some simple examples of modified Taylor rules.
37The discussion here refers to the responses marked “φω = 0” in Figure 6, which corresponds to
the Taylor rule (1.21).
26
2.1 Welfare criterion
We shall suppose that the objective of policy is to maximize the average ex ante
expected utility of the households. As shown in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), this

















































Note that the final term in (2.2) represents the average disutility of working, aver-
aging both over the entire continuum of types of labor j and over the two types of
households, using the model of equilibrium labor supply discussed in section 1.1.
Using this welfare criterion, we can compute the equilibrium responses to the var-
ious types of shocks in our model under an optimal policy commitment (the Ramsey
policy problem). This problem is treated in more detail in Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2009). Here we are interested not in characterizing fully optimal policy, but in the
extent to which various simple modifications of the Taylor would result in a closer
approximation to Ramsey policy. One way in which we judge the closeness of the
approximation is by comparing the responses to shocks under candidate policy rules
to those that would occur under the Ramsey policy.
We also evaluate the level of welfare associated with alternative simple rules (modi-
fied Taylor rules of various types), using a method proposed by Benigno andWoodford
(2008). Under this approach, one computes (for the equilibrium associated with each
candidate policy rule) the value of a quadratic approximation to the Lagrangian for
an optimization problem that corresponds to the continuation of a previously chosen
Ramsey policy; this approximate Lagrangian is minimized by a time-invariant linear
rule under which the responses to shocks are the same (to a linear approximation) as
under the Ramsey policy. By computing the value of this Lagrangian under a given
27
time-invariant policy rule, we have a criterion that would rank as best (among all
possible linear rules) a rule that achieves exactly the responses to shocks associated
with the Ramsey policy. We use this method to rank the benefits from alternative
spread-adjusted or credit-adjusted Taylor rules; this is a more formal way of assess-
ing the degree to which a given modification of the Taylor rule leads to responses to
shocks that are closer to those implied by Ramsey policy.38
2.2 Spread-Adjusted Taylor Rules
Let us first consider generalizations of (1.21) of the form
ıˆdt = r
n
t + φpipit + φy(Yˆt − Yˆ nt )− φωωˆt. (2.3)
for some coefficient 0 ≤ φω ≤ 1. These rules reflect the idea that the funds rate should
be lowered when credit spreads increase, so as to prevent the increase in spreads from
“effectively tightening monetary conditions” in the absence of any justification from
inflation or high output relative to potential. They essentially correspond to the
proposal of authors such as McCulley and Toloui (2008) and Taylor (2008), except
that we consider the possible advantages of a spread adjustment that is less than the
size of the increase in credit spreads. (The proposal of these authors corresponds to
the case φω = 1; the classic Taylor rule corresponds to the opposite limiting case,
φω = 0.) We now omit the random term ²
m
t , as there is nothing desirable about
unnecessary randomization of policy.39
In the previous section, we have discussed the economy’s response to a variety
of types of disturbances under this kind of policy rule, in the case that φω = 0.
We now consider the consequences of alternative values for φω > 0, and compare the
equilibrium responses to shocks under this kind of policy to those under Ramsey policy
(i.e., an optimal policy commitment). Figures 6-11 present numerical responses in the
case of several different types of exogenous disturbances, when the model is calibrated
38See Altissimo et al. (2005) for discussion of a numerical method that can be used to compute
this welfare measure.
39In fact, in some models arbitrary randomization of monetary policy would raise welfare, as in the
example of Dupor (2003). But we verify that under our numerical parameterization, the Lagrangian
for our policy problem is locally convex, so that randomization is necessarily welfare-reducing (at
least in the case of a small enough random term). See Benigno and Woodford (2008) for discussion
of this issue, and the algebraic conditions that must be verified.
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in the same way as in the previous section, for the case of a convex intermediation
technology.40
Figure 6 shows the responses of endogenous variables to a “purely financial” dis-
turbance — specifically, to an exogenous shift up in the schedule χt(b), of a size that
would increase the credit spread by 4 percentage points (as an annualized rate) for a
given volume of private credit. (Because of the contraction of credit that results, in
equilibrium the shock only increases the credit spread by a little over one percentage
point.41) In the case that policy is described by the baseline Taylor rule (1.21), such
a disturbance leads not only to an increase in the credit spread and a contraction
of aggregate credit, but also to a substantial fall in aggregate real activity and to
a drop in the rate of inflation. (These responses are shown by the dashed lines in
the figure.) This contraction of output is inefficient. Under an optimal monetary
policy commitment (shown by the solid lines in the figure), output would decline
much less, and only temporarily; indeed, output would be back to (and even slightly
above) its normal level by the quarter following the shock, even though the financial
disturbance persists for many quarters. (Here, as in all of our figures showing the
effects of non-monetary shocks except Figure 10, the disturbance to the path of χ˜t is
assumed to be an AR(1) process with a coefficient of serial correlation of ρξ = 0.9, so
that the half-life of the disturbance is 6.6 quarters.) Nor would inflation be allowed
to decrease as under the Taylor rule; indeed, initially it would rise slightly.
The figure also plots the equilibrium responses of the several endogenous variables
under several variant monetary policy rules of the form (2.3). Responses are shown in
the case of five different possible values of φω, ranging between 0 and 1. We observe
that adjusting the intercept of the Taylor rule in response to changes in the credit
spread can indeed largely remedy the defects of the simple Taylor rule, in the case
of a shock to the economy of this kind. And the optimal degree of adjustment is
not too far from 100 percent (the case shown by the dashed lines with lighter-colored
40We discuss differences in our conclusions in the case of a linear intermediation technology sub-
sequently.
41This is clearly a large shock, relative to what occurs with any frequency during normal periods;
but increases in spreads even larger than this were observed in the fall of 2008. We do not here
consider an even larger shock, in order to avoid having to deal with the consequences of the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates — a technical issue that becomes relevant only in the case of
particularly large disturbances, though one that did indeed become relevant in the US and elsewhere
as a result of the 2008 crisis.
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Table 1: Optimal value of the spread-adjustment coefficient φω in policy rule (2.3),
in the case of a convex intermediation technology. Each column indicates a different
type of disturbance, for which the policy rule is optimized; each row indicates a
different possible degree of persistence for the disturbance.
Zt µ
w







ρξ = 0.00 1.08 -7.89 -15.01 1.53 0.62 1.08 0.64 1.07 0.86 0.64
ρξ = 0.50 1.35 -2.18 -4.42 2.22 0.71 1.35 0.60 0.72 0.84 0.72
ρξ = 0.90 0.21 -0.12 -0.30 0.30 0.74 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.82 0.75
ρξ = 0.99 -1.38 -1.44 -1.47 -1.37 0.65 -1.38 -1.39 -1.39 0.70 0.66
dots), as proposed by Taylor and by McCulley and Toloui. To be more precise, both
inflation and output increase a little more under the 100 percent spread adjustment
than they would under Ramsey policy; but the optimal responses of both variables
are between the paths that would result from a 75 percent spread adjustment and the
one that results from a 100 percent spread adjustment. If we optimize our welfare
criterion over policy rules with alternative values of φω, assuming that this type of
disturbance is the only kind that ever occurs, the welfare maximum is reached when
φω = 0.82, as shown in Table 1.
It is interesting to observe in Figure 6 that, while a superior policy involves a
reduction in the policy rate relative to what the unadjusted Taylor rule would pre-
scribe, this does not mean that under such a policy the central bank actually cuts its
interest rate target more sharply in equilibrium. The size of the fall in the policy rate
(shown in the middle left panel) is about the same regardless of the value of φω; but
when φω is near 1, output and inflation no longer have to decline in order to induce
the central bank to accept an interest-rate cut of this size, and in equilibrium they
do not decline. (In fact, the nominal policy rate does fall a little more, and since
expected inflation does not fall, the real interest rates faced by both savers and bor-
rowers fall more substantially when φω is near 1.) The contraction of private credit
in equilibrium is also virtually the same regardless of the value of φω. Nonetheless,
aggregate expenditure falls much less when φω is positive; the expenditure of borrow-
ers no longer has to be cut back so much in order to reduce their borrowing, because
their labor income no longer falls in response to the shock, and there is an offsetting
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increase in the expenditure of savers.
The figure is very similar in the case of an exogenous shock to the marginal
resource cost of intermediation (an exogenous increase in the multiplicative factor Ξ˜t,
not shown). As indicated in Table 1, in this case the optimal response coefficient is
only slightly smaller, 0.75. The other comments about the shock to χ˜t apply equally
to this case. Moreover, while the dynamics of the equilibrium responses are different
if one assumes a degree of persistence other than ρξ = 0.9, we find — both in the
case of disturbances that are less persistent than assumed in our baseline case, and
in the case of disturbances that are more persistent — that our key conclusion is the
same regardless of the assumed degree of persistence of the financial disturbance: a
value of φω that is positive and a large fraction of 1 maximizes welfare in the case of
any individual disturbance of either of these two types. (Several different assumed
values for ρξ are considered on the different lines of Table 1.)
We also reach similar conclusions in the case of an exogenous disturbance to the
level of the public debt, of the kind assumed in Figure 5. As shown in Figure 7, the
effects of this kind of shock under the various spread-adjusted rules are quite similar
to the effects of a purely financial disturbance (though with the opposite sign of the
disturbance considered in Figure 6). Essentially, this disturbance matters for output
and inflation determination only because of its effect on the supply of credit to private
borrowers: because government borrowing crowds out private borrowing, equilibrium
credit spreads fall (as was also shown for the “FF” case in Figure 5). This is also
associated with increases in output and inflation that are inefficient, and would be
prevented by an optimal monetary policy response (as shown by the solid lines in
Figure 7). A spread-adjusted Taylor rule achieves something quite similar to optimal
policy, especially for a spread adjustment on the order of φω = 0.75. (Because the
spread falls in response to this shock, the spread adjustment implies greater tightening
of policy in response to the fiscal shock than would occur under the baseline Taylor
rule, and this prevents output and inflation from increasing.) As shown in Table 1,
the optimal spread adjustment would in fact be φω = 0.74 in the case of a debt shock
with a persistence of 0.9, and again this result is not too sensitive to the assumed
degree of persistence of the disturbance.
However, our conclusions about the optimal spread adjustment are considerably
more varied when we consider other kinds of disturbances. In the case of an endoge-
nous credit spread, as assumed here, a spread adjustment in the Taylor rule affects
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the economy’s equilibrium response to disturbances of all types, and not just distur-
bances originating in the financial sector, and the benefits of a spread adjustment
are not the same regardless of the source of the variation in the equilibrium credit
spread. In the case of the debt shock, this did not materially change the case for the
desirability of the spread adjustment, but the same is not true of other types of dis-
turbances that also affect the aggregate volume of lending and hence the equilibrium
credit spread.
For example, Figure 8 considers again the consequences of a technology shock of
the same kind as in Figure 4. In the case of this type of shock, the baseline Taylor
rule is not too poor an approximation to optimal policy. In fact, in the absence
of financial distortions (as discussed above), the baseline Taylor rule (1.21) would
achieve a precisely optimal response to this type of shock: it would perfectly stabilize
both inflation and the output gap (output would be allowed to rise to precisely the
extent that the natural rate of output rises), as shown by the “NoFF” responses in
Figure 4, and this would be optimal (as discussed in Benigno and Woodford, 2005).
In our model with financial frictions, it is no longer quite true that this rule would
completely stabilize inflation, though the inflation response is still quite small (again,
as shown in Figure 4); nor is it any longer true that optimal policy would fully
stabilize inflation, but here too the optimal departure from strict inflation targeting
is fairly modest (as shown by the solid line in Figure 8). Given that the unadjusted
Taylor rule is quite a good rule in this case, it should not surprise one to observe that
a spread adjustment can easily do more harm than good. Because aggregate credit
surges in response to a technological improvement, and the credit spread accordingly
increases, a spread adjustment means a looser policy in response to such a shock, and
except in the case of a very modest adjustment of this kind, the resulting inflationary
boom would clearly be undesirable. In fact, Table 1 shows that in the case of a shock
with persistence ρξ = 0.9, as assumed in the figure, the optimal spread adjustment is
only φω = 0.21.
We reach a similar conclusion in the case of a shock to the path of government
purchases Gt, as shown in Figure 9. Here again the unadjusted Taylor rule would fully
stabilize inflation in the absence of financial frictions, and in a model with no steady-
state distortions, this would be optimal (though it is not quite the optimal response
even in a representative-household model, in the presence of steady-state distortions
due to market power and/or taxes, as discussed by Benigno and Woodford, 2005); and
32
this rule is not too different from optimal policy even in our model with credit frictions,
though it would be desirable to reduce inflation slightly for a short period of time
following such a shock (as shown by the solid line in the figure). Because government
purchases crowd out the spending of type b households (the more interest-sensitive
category of private spending) more than that of type s households, aggregate credit
falls in response to such a shock, and hence the credit spread shrinks as well. A spread
adjustment therefore tightens policy more in response to such a shock, and this can
help to bring about the desired temporary reduction in inflation. But because the
reduction in credit and in the spread in response to such a disturbance are relatively
persistent, the spread adjustment keeps policy tight for much longer than is optimal;
and as a consequence, any spread adjustment that is a large fraction of a full offset
does more harm than good. Table 1 shows that in the case of a shock with persistence
ρξ = 0.9, as assumed in Figure 9, the optimal spread adjustment is again much less
than half (φω = 0.30).
Moreover, Table 1 makes it clear that the optimal spread adjustment in the case
of either of these types of disturbances is quite sensitive to the degree of persistence
of the disturbance. The optimal adjustment is 100 percent or even more, in the case
that the disturbances are sufficiently transitory. But the optimal adjustment need
not even be positive, and is not in the case of sufficiently persistent disturbances. For
example, Figure 10 shows responses to a technology shock that is more persistent
than the one assumed in Figure 8 (ρξ = 0.99). In this case, the unadjusted Taylor
rule results in more inflation in response to the productivity improvement than is
optimal, mainly as a result of the adverse “cost-push” effect of the increase in the
credit spread; a positive spread adjustment would result in even looser policy (as
discussed above), and in this case would adjust policy in the wrong direction, even
in the case of a modest spread adjustment. As shown in Table 1, the optimal spread
adjustment in this case would actually be negative (φω = −1.47), and the same
would be true of a highly persistent disturbance to government purchases. Indeed,
we obtain qualitatively similar conclusions for all of the disturbances that (i) do not
create any tension between price stability and output-gap stabilization, in the case
of an undistorted steady state, and (ii) do not primarily effect the economy through
interference with financial intermediation:42 in each case a substantial positive spread
42The shocks in this category are the Zt, Gt, H¯t, Cbt , and C
s
t shocks: all have substantial effects on
equilibrium output even in the absence of all distortions, and all of these types of output fluctuations
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adjustment would be optimal in the case of low enough persistence, while a strongly
negative spread adjustment is instead optimal in the case of high enough persistence.
In the case of other types of disturbances, the optimal spread adjustment may be
negative even in the case of less highly persistent shocks. Figure 11 shows equilibrium
responses to an exogenous increase in the path of the tax rate τ t, again for the case
ρξ = 0.9. Once again, the unadjusted Taylor rule does a good job of stabilizing
inflation in response to the shock; in fact, since this type of disturbance has little
effect on equilibrium credit and hence on the credit spread, the unadjusted Taylor rule
is practically equivalent to a strict inflation target, even in the presence of financial
frictions. But in the case of this type of shock, complete inflation stabilization is not
optimal, even in the case of a representative household-model with no steady-state
distortions, because of the “cost-push” effect of the shock: output must be contracted
in order to maintain a constant inflation rate, and this output reduction is inefficient.
Under an optimal policy, some inflation must be accepted in order to require less
of a reduction in output relative to its efficient level (which does not fall like the
flexible-price equilibrium level of output).
In this case, because there is little effect of the shock on the equilibrium credit
spread, a spread adjustment cannot do much to cure the inefficiency of the baseline
Taylor rule. But to the extent that a spread adjustment has an effect, it is a perverse
one: since the spread declines slightly in response to this disturbance, the spread
adjustment tightens policy more in response to the adverse fiscal shock, when it
would actually be desirable to allow more inflation, as just explained. Table 1 shows
that the optimal spread-adjustment coefficient is actually negative, and that this is
true regardless of the degree of persistence of the shock, though the optimal size
of the negative adjustment is quite sensitive to the persistence of the shock. (A
coefficient φω = −.30 is optimal in the case that ρξ = 0.9, as assumed in the figure;
but much larger negative coefficients are optimal in the case of tax shocks that are
either more or less persistent than this.) Similar conclusions are obtained in the case
of a disturbance to the size of the wage markup µwt , and for similar reasons.
The fact that different sizes (or even signs) of spread adjustments are desirable in
the case of different types of disturbances makes it difficult to draw a conclusion about
the nature of the optimal spread adjustment, given that any actual economy will be
are consistent with the optimality of complete price stability, as explained for example in Woodford
(2003, chap. 6, sec. 3).
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Table 2: Welfare consequences of increasing φω, in the case of different disturbances.
Each column indicates a different type of disturbance, while each row corresponds to
a given degree of spread adjustment.
Zt µ
w







No persistence (ρξ = 0)
φω = 0.25 0.4 -0.8 -1.4 4.0 26.9 0.4 22.5 9.9 38.4 27.7
φω = 0.50 0.7 -1.6 -2.9 7.7 40.8 0.7 35.0 17.2 65.0 42.5
φω = 0.75 0.9 -2.6 -4.5 11.0 40.4 0.9 35.8 22.0 78.4 43.1
φω = 1.00 1.0 -3.7 -6.3 13.6 24.2 1.0 23.2 24.1 77.1 27.7
Persistence (ρξ = 0.9)
φω = 0.25 0.2 -0.7 -1.1 2.5 55.1 0.2 1.0 2.4 61.6 55.5
φω = 0.50 -0.3 -2.1 -3.0 1.3 89.5 -0.3 -10.0 -13.8 102.9 90.3
φω = 0.75 -1.6 -4.3 -5.5 -3.8 101.1 -1.6 -33.6 -49.4 121.9 102.3
φω = 1.00 -3.7 -7.2 -8.9 -13.1 87.6 -3.7 -70.6 -105.8 116.2 89.4
subject to disturbances of many types. It is necessary to balance the considerations
that arise in the case of each individual type of disturbance. When doing this, it is
important to consider not only the optimal spread adjustment in the case of a given
type of disturbance, but also the size of the change in welfare achieved by a spread
adjustment in each case. Table 2 reports the welfare change (relative to the baseline
Taylor rule) for each of the types of shocks, for each of several different possible sizes
of spread adjustment (the same four values of φω considered in the figures). The first
part of the table shows results for the case of disturbances with zero persistence, the
second part for the case of disturbances with ρ = 0.9. In the case of each type of
disturbance, the amplitude of the shock is normalized so that the standard deviation
of fluctuations in output around trend will be one percentage point, in the case that
that disturbance is the only kind that exists.
When considering the overall advantage of a given increase in the spread adjust-
ment, it is necessary to consider the implications of a single contemplated change in
the policy rule for the way in which the economy will respond to all of the differ-
ent types of disturbances to which it is subject at different times. It is possible to
determine this, however, by looking across a given row of the table. For example,
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suppose that in a given economy, 50 percent of output fluctuations (relative to trend)
are due to productivity shocks, 25 percent are due to variations in the spending op-
portunities of credit-dependent (type b) households, and 25 percent are due to credit
spread variations resulting from shocks to the default rate. Suppose furthermore that
each of the three types of disturbances that occur have serial correlation coefficient
ρ = 0.9 (so that the second part of Table 2 applies), and that the three disturbances
are independent of one another (so that we can simply sum the contributions of the
three disturbances to our quadratic loss function).43 Then a change in the value of
φω will raise welfare if and only if raises W
tot = 0.5WZ + 0.25WCb + 0.25Wχ˜, where
WZ is the welfare measure reported in the Zt column of Table 2, WCb is the welfare
measure reported in the C¯bt column, and so on.
For example, in the case of an increase in φω from 0.25 to 0.50, the table indicates
that Wχ˜ increases, while WZ and WCb both fall. However, the increase in Wχ˜ is
larger than the declines in either of the other two quantities. If we use the weights
just proposed, W tot increases by a net amount of 7.4, so that the increase in the
spread adjustment would be beneficial in welfare terms, despite the fact that it leads
to a less optimal response to two of the types of disturbances.44 Instead, in the case
of increase in φω from 0.50 to 0.75, the net change in W
tot is negative (-7.7), so that
the increase would reduce welfare, even though Wχ˜ still increases. Thus under this
assumption about the relative importance of different shocks, we would conclude that
a partial spread adjustment of φω = 0.50 would be best among the alternatives in the
table.
While the results of this calculation depend on what we assume about the relative
importance of different sources of aggregate fluctuations in real activity, we can offer
some (cautious) generalizations even without undertaking to estimate the relative
importances of the different disturbances in the context of a macroeconometric model.
We observe that the variations in the spread adjustment do not make a great difference
for welfare except in the case of two types of shocks: shocks that affect the economy
43Of course, there is no reason why these disturbances are necessarily distributed independently
of one another. For example, the preferences of type b households and of type s households need not
fluctuate independently of one another. But to deal with this possibility, we would need additional
information beyond that reported in Table 2. In effect, we would have to consider additional types
of disturbances besides those reported in the table: a disturbance that raises C¯bt and C¯
s
t in the same
proportion, a disturbance that raises τ t by half the amount of the increase in Gt, and so on.
44This assumes, of course, that only policy rules within the restricted family (2.3) are considered.
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by interfering with credit flows (the χ˜t, Ξ˜t, and b
g
t shocks) on the one hand, and
shocks to private spending opportunities45 (the C¯bt and C¯
s
t shocks) on the other.
If either intermediation shocks (of whatever degree of persistence) or expenditure
shocks that are sufficiently transitory are responsible for any substantial fraction of
aggregate variability, then a positive spread adjustment is likely to improve welfare,
but the optimal adjustment is in general well below a 100 percent adjustment. The
only important qualification to this conclusion is in the case that relatively persistent
expenditure shocks are also quite important. If shocks of this type are sufficiently
important relative to shocks in the other category, the desirable size of the spread
adjustment is reduced, although, as in the numerical example just considered, a
partial spread adjustment on the order of 50 percent could easily still be justified.46
The considerations involved in judging the optimal spread adjustment are simpler
in some respects in the case that we assume a linear intermediation technology (along
with our maintained assumption in the above calculations that χt(b) is linear). In this
case, the credit spread is an exogenous process, so that a spread adjustment to the
Taylor rule has no consequences (in our log-linear approximation) for the economy’s
response to disturbances other than purely financial disturbances (shocks to χ˜t or to
Ξ˜t, the two determinants of the credit spread). Moreover, the consequences of a spread
adjustment are quite similar in the case of these two types of financial disturbances;
so it might seem that we should be able to choose the spread adjustment so as to
45Note that in the context of our model, where consumption spending and investment spending
are not distinguished, these disturbances may be taken to represent variations in opportunities for
profitable investment spending, and not just opportunities for consumer expenditure.
46The relative robustness of our conclusions to alternative hypotheses about the relative impor-
tance of alternative disturbances depends importantly on the fact that our baseline Taylor rule (1.21)
includes adjustments for variations in the natural rate of output and in the natural rate of interest,
which allows the rule to respond relatively well to a variety of types of non-financial disturbances.
If we were instead to use as our baseline case a Taylor rule in which the natural rate of interest
is assumed to be a constant and the natural rate of output is assumed to be a deterministic trend
(as in many calculations of “Taylor rules” in practice), then equilibrium responses to many real
disturbances would be quite inefficient under such a rule, even in a model without financial frictions.
Moreover, there is no general pattern in the way the consequences of a spread adjustment would
compare to the way in which the Taylor rule would need to be adjusted to correct for the shifts in
the natural rates, in the case of different types of disturbances. As a result, our conclusions about
the effects of a spread adjustment would vary much more depending on the types of disturbances
judged to be most important. See the technical appendix for details of our results for this case.
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Table 3: Optimal value of the spread-adjustment coefficient φω in policy rule (2.3),
as in Table 1, but for the case of a linear intermediation technology.
χ˜t Ξ˜t
ρξ = 0.00 1.84 1.30
ρξ = 0.50 1.62 1.40
ρξ = 0.90 0.26 0.28
ρξ = 0.99 -2.43 -2.36
optimize the response to a single type of shock. However, as shown in Table 3, the
optimal spread adjustment is quite different depending on the degree of persistence of
the financial disturbances. It is positive and even greater than 1, in the case of either
type of disturbance, if the degree of persistence is ρξ = 0.5 or less. But the optimal
degree of spread adjustment is much smaller (on the order of 0.25, for either type
of disturbance) if instead we assume ρξ = 0.9. In the case of even more persistent
financial disturbances, the optimal spread adjustment changes sign. If, for example,
we assume ρξ = 0.99, the optimal spread adjustment is more negative than -2, for
either type of disturbance.
Hence our conclusions about the optimal spread adjustment are actually less ro-
bust in this case to alternative assumptions about the relative importance of different
shocks, since the result differs greatly depending on the relative importance of fi-
nancial shocks of differing degrees of persistence. (There is no reason, of course, to
assume that all financial disturbances are of any one degree of persistence.) However,
despite the attention given to the case of a linear intermediation technology in our
previous work (Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2009), because of the possibility of obtaining
analytical results for this case, we are inclined toward the view that it is more realistic
to assume significant capacity constraints in lending (meaning substantial convexity
of the cost function). For this reason, our conclusions for the convex case may be of
more practical relevance.
Whether this is the case or not, our results indicate that the same size of spread
adjustment is not desirable regardless of the nature of the disturbances that are
responsible for the change in credit spreads. This is an important reason for the
superiority of an alternative approach to the problem, in which the central bank’s
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policy commitment is formulated in terms of a target criterion that its interest-rate
instrument is adjusted to achieve, rather than in terms of a Taylor-type instrument
rule for the policy rate. We consider the advantages of a particular type of “flexible
inflation targeting rule” in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), and show that in the case of
a linear intermediation technology, this rule would imply a larger spread adjustment
in the case of less persistent financial disturbances. We discuss this alternative further
in the conclusion.
2.3 Responding to Variations in Aggregate Credit
Some have suggested that because of imperfections in financial intermediation, it is
more important for central banks to monitor and respond to variations in the volume
of bank lending than would be the case if the “frictionless” financial markets of Arrow-
Debreu theory were more nearly descriptive of reality. A common recommendation in
this vein is that monetary policy should be used to help to stabilize aggregate private
credit, by tightening policy when credit is observed to grow unusually strongly and
loosening policy when credit is observed to contract. For example, Christiano et
al. (2007) propose that a Taylor rule that is adjusted in response to variations in
aggregate credit may represent an improvement upon an unadjusted Taylor rule.
In order to consider the possible advantages of such an adjustment, we now pro-
pose to replace (1.21) by a rule of the form
ıˆdt = r
n
t + φpipit + φy(Yˆt − Yˆ nt ) + φbbˆt, (2.4)
for some coefficient φb, the sign of which we shall not prejudge. (Christiano et al.,
like most proponents of credit-based policies, argue for the desirability of a positive
coefficient.) Figure 12 illustrates the consequences of alternative degrees of response
(of either sign) to credit variations, in the case of the same kind of increase in govern-
ment debt as in Figures 5 and 7, again in an economy with a convex intermediation
technology, and with φpi and φy set at the Taylor values.
Because in the case of a convex intermediation technology (and in the absence of
“purely financial” disturbances) the credit spread ωt is a monotonic function of the
aggregate volume of private credit bt (and in our log-linear approximation, ωˆt is a
linear function of bˆt), any rule of the form (2.4) is actually equivalent to a particular
rule of the form (2.3), as far as our model’s predictions about the responses to all
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Table 4: Optimal value of the response coefficient φb in policy rule (2.4), for the same
set of possible disturbances as in Table 1, and a convex intermediation technology.
Zt µ
w







ρξ = 0.00 -1.08 7.89 15.01 -1.53 -0.62 -1.08 -0.64 -1.07 1.14 0.97
ρξ = 0.50 -1.35 2.18 4.42 -2.22 -0.71 -1.35 -0.60 -0.72 0.42 0.40
ρξ = 0.90 -0.21 0.12 0.30 -0.30 -0.74 -0.21 -0.15 -0.16 0.06 0.06
ρξ = 0.99 1.38 1.44 1.47 1.37 -0.65 1.38 1.39 1.39 0.00 0.00
non-financial shocks (shocks that do not shift the equilibrium relation between ωt and
bt) are concerned. Under our calibration, a rule of the form (2.4) with a coefficient
φb is equivalent to a rule of the form (2.3) with coefficient φω = −φb. Hence the
results shown in Figure 12 (at least for the two cases with φb < 0) are actually the
same as those in Figure 7 (for the corresponding values of φω > 0). As noted before,
the optimal spread adjustment in this case is positive (and a substantial fraction of
1); it follows that the optimal value of φb for this kind of shock is negative (in fact,
-0.74, as reported in Table 4). The baseline Taylor rule accommodates this type of
disturbance to too great an extent, allowing inflation and output to increase more
than they would under an optimal policy. But this type of shock reduces private
credit (government borrowing crowds out private borrowing), so a positive value of
φb would mean an even looser policy in response to the shock, making the equilibrium
responses even farther from optimal policy.
Table 4 reports the optimal value of φb in the rule (2.4), in the case of each of the
types of individual disturbances considered in Table 1, using the same format as the
earlier table.47 The results for disturbances other than χ˜t and Ξ˜t all follow directly
from the results in Table 1. As before, we find that both the sign and magnitude
of the optimal response coefficient depends on which types of disturbances one is
47The coefficients in the table indicate the desired increase in the policy rate target, expressed in
percentage points per year, per percentage point increase in real aggregate credit. Thus φb = 1.14
means that a one percent greater volume of aggregate credit raises the operating target for the
policy rate by 1.14 percentage points per year, in the absence of any change in inflation or output.
If, in equation (2.4), ıˆdt and pit are understood to be quarterly rates, then the coefficient on bˆt in
that equation should be written as φb/4.
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concerned with. But in particular, to the extent that our previous results showed
that a positive spread adjustment would often be beneficial (even in the case of non-
financial disturbances) — in particular, the optimal spread adjustment was positive,
not only in the case of the government debt shock, but in the case of all of the
real non-financial disturbances that are not “cost-push” shocks, as long as those
disturbances are not extremely persistent — this would correspond to a preference
for a negative value of φb, rather than a positive value as assumed in most discussion
of this proposal.
However, the results in Table 1 according to which it is desirable for φω to be
positive in the case of “purely financial” disturbances do not imply that it is optimal
for φb to be negative, since these disturbances shift the equilibrium relation between
aggregate credit and the credit spread. In fact, Table 4 shows that the optimal φb in
the case of either of the two types of purely financial disturbances is at least slightly
positive. As in our discussion of the spread adjustment, we find that it is desirable
to loosen policy in response to a shock that increases ωt(b¯), to a greater extent than
would occur under the unadjusted Taylor rule; but because credit contracts in re-
sponse to such a disturbance (at the same time that the credit spread increases),
this is achieved by setting φb > 0. Nonetheless, the table shows that except when
the disruption of financial intermediation is quite transitory, the optimal response
coefficient is relatively small. Figure 13 shows how alternative sizes of responses to
aggregate credit change the equilibrium responses to an increase in the default rate
with persistence ρ = 0.9, the same kind of disturbance considered in Figure 6. One
sees that responses to credit of either sign make the economy’s equilibrium response
farther from what would occur under optimal policy, when the responses are of mod-
erate size (the sizes of response that would be optimal in the case of many other types
of disturbance). The optimal response to variation in aggregate credit is positive in
this case, but quite small (φb = 0.06).
On the whole, in our view, it is even harder to find a policy within the class (2.4)
that is reasonably good regardless of the type of disturbance affecting the economy
than it is to find a robust rule within the class (2.3). In the case of the spread-
adjusted rules, we obtained fairly consistent conclusions about the more desirable
rules in the case of both types of financial disturbances and the government-debt
shocks, regardless of the persistence of disturbances; and these were the only kind
of disturbances for which the spread adjustment had a significant effect on welfare
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Table 5: Optimal value of the response coefficient φb in policy rule (2.4), for the same
set of possible disturbances as in Table 5, but a linear intermediation technology.
Zt µ
w







ρξ = 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ρξ = 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ρξ = 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ρξ = 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(if we set aside the case of highly persistent private expenditure shocks). But with
the credit-adjusted rules, the sign of the optimal response is opposite between the
financial disturbances and the government debt shocks; and the magnitude of the
optimal credit adjustment is very different in the case of financial disturbances with
different degrees of persistence. Hence it is harder to make a case that any adjustment
in response to variations in aggregate private credit would clearly be desirable.
In the case of a linear intermediation technology, instead, rules in the family (2.4)
are no longer equivalent to any rules in the family (2.3) in the case of non-financial
disturbances. One might think that in this case there could be an advantage of a
credit-adjustment rule relative to the spread-adjusted Taylor rules: whereas a spread
adjustment cannot improve upon the rule’s response to non-financial disturbances, a
credit adjustment might. However, a credit adjustment turns out to lower welfare,
regardless of the sign of the response, in almost all cases. Table 5 reports the optimal
value of φb for each of the types of disturbance considered in Table 4, but for the
case of the linear technology (η = 1). The optimal coefficient is close to zero in all
cases. The reason is that, with no endogenous variation in the credit spread, the
baseline Taylor rule is already relatively close to representing optimal policy in the
case of the non-financial disturbances. But since the volume of credit is affected by
the disturbances, a credit adjustment would mean departing from the baseline Taylor
rule, which is not necessary. The spread adjustment, which in this economy will
modify the Taylor rule only in the case of purely financial disturbances, is therefore
a more desirable type of modification of the baseline rule.
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3 Conclusion
We have considered two possible ways in which the standard Taylor rule might be
modified to include a response to financial conditions: by adding a response to vari-
ations in a credit spread, as proposed by McCulley and Toloui (2008) and Taylor
(2008); or by adding a response to a measure of aggregate private credit, as proposed
by Christiano et al. (2007) among others. According to the model that we have used
to analyze this issue, either type of adjustment, if of an appropriate magnitude, can
improve equilibrium responses to disturbances originating in the financial sector. (In
the case of the spread adjustment, this would require that the policy rate be reduced,
relative to what the standard Taylor rule would prescribe, when credit spreads are
larger than normal; in the case of a credit response, it would require that the policy
rate be reduced when the volume of credit is smaller than normal.) However, even if
this is the only kind of disturbance with which we must be concerned, the optimal
degree of spread adjustment is likely to be less than a 100 percent offset for the in-
crease in credit spreads; and the optimal degree of response to a reduction in credit
will be much less strong than would be required to fully stabilize aggregate credit at
some target level.
Neither type of simple proportional adjustment is ideal, however, since the time
path of the distortions that one would like to offset is in general not the same as
the dynamic response of either of these two indicators to the disturbance. In the
model of Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), the most important perturbations of the
model structural relations due to credit frictions are direct functions of the path of
the credit spread ωt; but many of the additional terms involve the marginal-utility
gap Ωt (which, to a linear approximation, is a forward-looking moving average of the
credit spread) rather than the contemporaneous credit spread alone. The dynamic
response of aggregate credit is even less similar to that of the distortions. At the time
of a financial disturbance, credit contracts while the distortions (measured either by
ωt or Ωt) increase; but subsequently, as the underlying disturbance (the shift in the
functions Ξt(b) or χt(b)) dissipates but its effects persist, a lower volume of credit will
be associated with lower values of both ωt and Ωt.
Simple proposals of this kind are even less adequate once one considers their con-
sequences for the economy’s responses to other kinds of disturbances besides purely
financial ones. Disturbances of all sorts should cause endogenous variation in the
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volume of private credit, but the response coefficient φb that would represent the best
modification of a standard Taylor rule is quite different in the case of different types
of disturbances; in particular, in many cases, it would be better for monetary policy
to be loosened when credit expands (rather than when it contracts) as a consequence
of a non-financial disturbance, though the optimal sign of φb is positive in the case
of most financial disturbances. In the case that the credit spread is endogenous (as
in the “convex intermediation technology” case treated above), disturbances of all
sorts cause credit spreads to vary as well, and a spread adjustment would also have
implications for the economy’s response to each of these disturbances. The tension
between what is desirable in the case of different types of disturbances is somewhat
less acute in this case, as a positive value for φω is preferred in the case of many
non-financial disturbances as in the case of the purely financial disturbances; but
there are considerable differences in the size of adjustment that is best in the case of
different types of disturbances.
A superior approach to either kind of simple rule, at least in principle, is to
adjust the policy instrument so as to imply economic projections for inflation and
real activity that are consistent with a target criterion, as discussed in Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2009). Assuming that the model used to produce these projections takes
correct account of the implications of financial conditions for aggregate demand and
supply, this will imply a response to changing financial conditions in the way that
the central bank sets its target for the policy rate. But the response that is called
for is not a simple proportional response to any single measure of financial condi-
tions. A forecast-targeting central bank will properly take account of many credit
spreads rather than just one; it will take account of whether changes in credit spreads
indicate disruptions of the financial sector as opposed to endogenous responses to de-
velopments elsewhere in the economy; and it will calibrate its response depending on
its best guess about the likely persistence of disturbances on a particular occasion.
Of course, the degree to which such an approach should be expected to improve upon
a simple rule depends on the quantity and quality of information available for use
in the construction of projections; and the use of a more complex (and inevitably
more judgmental) approach creates greater challenges with regard to transparency
and accountability. Nonetheless, the advantages of such an approach seem to us even
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Figure 1: Marginal utilities of consumption for households of the two types. The




their corresponding steady-state marginal utilities.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1 percent (annualized) shock to ²mt , in three different
models with a linear intermediation technology.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1 percent (annualized) shock to ²mt , in three different
models with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to Zt, in three different models with
a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a shock to bgt equal to 1 percent of annual steady-state
output, in three different models with a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a shock to χ˜t that increases ωt(b¯) initially by 4 per-
centage points (annualized), under alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a shock to bgt equal to 1 percent of annual steady-state
output, under alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to Zt, with persistence ρ = 0.9,
under alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a shock to Gt equal to 1 percent of annual steady-state
output, under alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to Zt, with persistence ρ = 0.99,
under alternative degrees of spread adjustment.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to τ t, under alternative degrees of
spread adjustment.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to a shock to bgt equal to 1 percent of annual steady-
state output, under alternative degrees of response to aggregate credit, in the case of
a convex intermediation technology.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to a shock to χ˜t that increases ωt(b¯) initially by 4
percentage points (annualized), under alternative degrees of response to aggregate
credit, in the case of a convex intermediation technology.
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